It should be noted, however, that Lyon`s argument has been the subject of strong criticism. See z.B. Allan Gibbard (1965) and Holly Goldman (1974). I am grateful to an anonymous critic of this publication for these quotes. As Lon Fuller and William Perdue pointed out in an influential 1939 article entitled «The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,» the damages awarded by the courts to those who have broken a promise or contract are considered to be proportionate to the prejudice suffered by the complainant when he relied on the promise. These and other considerations argue for a theory of promise based on expectations and trust, that is, a theory of expectation, contrary to a theory based on natural conventions or duties, and this is what a number of philosophers and theologies of law have done. This debate has given rise to considerable literature (see Swain 2013 for a good overview of this work). Contemporary treaty theory has a different kind of response to the problem of the fool, citing not the threat of punishing the sovereign, but the benefit of promise as a cooperative enterprise. Gauthier (1986: 164ff) argues as an example that the promise is rational even in cases where the net value of the waiver is greater than that of keeping the promise. Gauthier`s reasoning is pretty much as follows: by limiting their quest to maximize profits (always keep promises, regardless of local advantages, to do so), agents (ceteris paribus) can work together to find solutions to prisoners` dilemmas that are inaccessible to «stupid» simple maximizers of utility.
What is necessary to escape a prisoner`s dilemma is a reason for participants to trust each other, especially by trusting each other to do what he promises, even if it does not maximize their usefulness in doing so. Thus, only a partner willing to keep promises, even in cases where it would not maximize its usefulness (i.e. a donor of non-stupid promises), could count on him to do his part in a prisoner`s dilemma, and only those could therefore conclude the agreements that define them. In addition to this work, there is also a body of theses of game theory and economic theory that stem from the contractual project of grounding the obligation of guilt in a selfish rationality. Some important elements of this literature are Harsanyi (1955), Gauthier (1986), Hardin (1988), Narveson (1988), Binmore (1994), Skyrms (1996) and Verbeek (2002). Rawls tries to solve Prichard`s conundrum by allowing himself to go to the principle of fairness and not to the «general agreement to be at the Aihrer», but Robins maintains that this step does not stop the step backwards (Robins 1984: 127 ff). Robins sums up his argument as a dilemma: either the principle of fairness is strong enough to generate bonds of soda change, in this case it is a principle of tacit consent, and therefore the appeal is circular, or the principle of fairness is weak enough to avoid circularity and therefore too weak to understand the commitments of change. Robins argues for the first horn by asserting that the principle of fairness to generate enough commitments against free conduct to explain our commitments to keep promises, we must keep the «voluntary» participation of the promised in the convention something like the explicit acceptance of the agreement to pay the fees (obedience to the rules of the Convention) in exchange for benefits , and this looks like an agreement to keep promises through an agreement on the principle of fairness, which in turn is the circle.